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Partnerships have become an increasingly important part of a firm’s competitive strategy, but 
many of them seem to fail. The goal of this thesis is therefore to explore critical factors for 
partnership success and determine how a client-supplier partnership can become more successful. 
This is done by using the critical success factors presented by Kale & Singh (2009) and conducting 
a case study of the partnership between Magnar Eikeland Kontorutstyr AS and their supplier EMO, 
as well as the partnership between Magnar Eikeland Kontormaskiner AS and their supplier Ricoh 
Norge AS. The partnerships operate within the office supplies, and office machinery and digital 
solutions industry, respectively.  
 
The data collection has occurred through structured interviews with relevant employees within 
each company and has provided us with a foundation to describe how various factors affect the 
cooperation between partners. Our research shows that the presented theory largely coincides with 
our findings. However, we have discovered that contractual complexity does not necessarily have 
a negative impact on the dynamic between partners if their relational capital is strong. In such 
cases, the complexity will not be interpreted as a sign of mistrust, but rather as a way of reducing 
uncertainty and facilitating increased cooperation.  
 
Furthermore, when relational capital, knowledge exchange, and feedback routines are linked to 
specific individuals rather than organizations, partnerships are very exposed. Relational capital, 
knowledge exchange, and feedback should therefore be formalized and spread among several 
individuals in the partnered organizations to preserve these elements within the partnership. 
Moreover, partners' motives and intentions can change over time and have a significant impact on 
their partnership. It may therefore be wise to have mechanisms in place to address these changes, 
for example by having procedures for conflict resolution and contract amendments. Relational 
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Partnerships and alliances have become a core part of a firm’s competitive strategy, as they help 
maximize market control, enhance efficiencies, and gain access to new resources, capabilities and 
markets (Kogut, 1991; Ahuja, 2000; Garcı́a-Canal, Duarte, Criado, & Llaneza, 2002). However, 
many partnerships tend to fail, exhibiting failure rates between 30% and 70% (Bamford, Gomes-
Casseres, & Robinson, 2003; Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008). Established 
research cannot provide a clear answer as to why this is the case but do highlight factors that are 
critical for partnership success. It includes elements such as compatibility, commitment, conflict 
resolution, choice of governance mechanism, and so on (Kale & Singh, 2009). The high failure 
rate implies that partnering companies have an incorrect understanding of what elements are 
important for a partnership to succeed. The aim of this thesis is therefore to uncover factors that to 
a greater or lesser extent increases partnership success. Our research question is as follows: 
 
“How can a client-supplier partnership become more successful?”  
 
Success is a relative term that can be defined in many ways, but in this thesis, we define it as 
partnered companies’ ability to achieve a long-term partnership by increasing value creation 
beyond what they could have achieved on their own. To answer the research question, we will 
conduct a case study of two client-supplier partnerships in the office supplies- and solutions 
industry. The first partnership we seek to examine are between Magnar Eikeland Kontorutstyr AS 
(“MEK”) and EMO, while the second is between Magnar Eikeland Kontormaskiner (“MEKM”) 
and Ricoh Norge. The partnerships will be elaborated in part 1.1. The question is interesting 
because we can analyze important factors for having a successful partnership. It also gives us the 








MEK is a small sized retailer of office supplies in the B2B market that consists of 22 employees 
and had a revenue of 55 million NOK in 2019 (Proff.no, 2021b). Their main supplier is EMO, a 
nationwide B2B supplier of office products and currently a department within Staples Norway 
(EMO, 2021). In 2019, Staples Norway consisted of 400 employees and had a revenue of 1.5 
billion NOK (Proff.no, 2021d) MEKM is a small sized retailer and service provider of office 
machinery, digital office solutions, and payment solutions. It had a revenue of 22 million NOK in 
2019 and consists of 10 employees (Proff.no, 2021a). Their main supplier is Ricoh Norge, a 
nationwide supplier of printing products and solutions. In 2019, it consisted of 105 employees and 
had a revenue of 316 million NOK (Proff.no, 2021c). Both Ricoh Norge and EMO are part of large 
international corporations, while MEK and MEKM are local clients of their Norwegian branch. 
MEKM and MEK are part of Magnar Eikeland Gruppen and are situated at Sola, Rogaland County, 
Norway. 
 
Half of the 50 largest companies in Rogaland operate within the oil- and gas industry (Næss, 2021), 
indicating that most businesses in Rogaland are directly or indirectly connected to it. 
Consequently, when the industry went into a downturn in 2014, it had a significant impact on many 
businesses in Rogaland, including MEK and MEKM (Board member MEG, 2021). As a result, it 
also had an indirect effect on their suppliers, as the suppliers’ financial results are contingent on 
MEK and MEKMs performance. Furthermore, the transition towards a paperless society coupled 
with challenges brought by Covid-19 have put an additional strain on their business model and 
financial results. This has forced the companies to adapt in order to maintain their revenue and 
market position. For example, by meeting the increasing demand for disinfectant products or by 
offering document processing systems rather than print (Board member MEG, 2021). This process 
is easier to accomplish in a partnership, as the partners can get access to more knowledge and 
resources, enabling them to quickly identify new opportunities and increase their competitiveness. 
For example, the client operates close to the end-customer and has relevant information about the 
customer's preferences and demand, which can be very useful for the suppliers when they want to 
find new sought-after products to offer their clients. Consequently, the value of the partnership 





market demand. When handled correctly, partnerships can therefore result in significant benefits 
for both parties.  
 
1.2 Thesis Delimitation 
Although this thesis provides insight into the importance of various factors for achieving 
partnership success, it does not cover how much resources one must invest in them. This is because 
it would have required much more extensive research than what was possible due to the time and 
resources available. Furthermore, the study is limited to only two client-supplier partnerships in 
the B2B market, although the companies are involved in several more. The reason for this is that 
we want to get a more in-depth understanding of how partnerships work. We have not talked to 
every employee in every company, but limited ourselves to management and strategically placed 
employees who have a connection to the partnership. This is because we believe that these 
employees are the ones who have the relevant knowledge to shed light on our problem. The thesis 
is conducted as a case study, as it was deemed to be the most appropriate method of collecting 
data. This is because the number of employees in the companies would limit the quality of a 
quantitative study.  
 
1.3 Layout  
The thesis is structured as follows:  
 
Figure 1 - Thesis Layout 
 
Section 1 introduces the research question and the context tied to it. Thereafter, it briefly presents 







Section 2 provides an overview of relevant theory that constitutes the foundation of this thesis. It 
includes critical elements such as key factors determining partnership success, an outline of the 
complex relationship between formal contracts and relational governance, and the “Relational 
View”. 
 
Section 3 presents the research methodology, explaining choice of research approach, data 
collection, and analysis. Furthermore, it gives the reader an opportunity to evaluate the thesis’s 
validity and reliability. Finally, it presents some ethical considerations and methodical reflections. 
 
Section 4 presents the data collected from interviews with relevant people within each firm, 
providing valuable insight into the inner workings of the two partnerships. The data is first 
structured in tables to give the reader a clear overview of the findings. Thereafter, the most 
important findings are summarized in a short paragraph under each table.  
 
Section 5 discusses the results and research question in light of theory. The aim is to provide 
argumentation for what factors are critical for partnership success. Quotes from the data collection 
are included to highlight important points. 
 
Section 6 offers concluding remarks and limitations of the study, as well as recommendations for 
further research on the topic.  
 








In this section we will present the theoretical elements that will be used to discuss the research 
question. The purpose is to explain to the readers what established theory suggests are important 
factors for partnership success and to build a theoretical foundation for our empirical research. The 
theory is mainly focused around Kale & Singh’s (2009) critical factors for alliance success, and 
includes factors such as complementarity, compatibility, commitment, contractual provisions, 
relational governance, trust and relational capital, conflict resolution, and relational view (See 




Figure 2 - Summary of Theory 
 
2.1 What Determines Partnership Success? 
A partnership can be defined as “a purposive relationship between two or more independent firms 
that involves the exchange, sharing, or codevelopment of resources or capabilities to achieve 
mutually relevant benefits” (Gulati, 1995). They can take on many different forms, ranging from 
joint ventures to equity and nonequity partnerships (Melville & Groves, 2015). According to Gulati 
(1998), the success of any single alliance or partnership is determined by some key factors that are 
important at each stage in the partnership life cycle. These include; (1) the Alliance Formation and 
Partner Selection stage, where firms select a fitting partner; (2) the Alliance Governance and 
Design stage, where firms establish appropriate governance mechanisms, and (3) the 
Postformation Alliance Management stage, where firms govern the partnership on a continuous 







Figure 3 - Critical Success Factors (Kale & Singh, 2009) 
 
2.1.1 Partnership Fit 
Shah & Swaminathan (2008) suggest that partnership performance is dependent on three key 
attributes: (1) partner complementarity, (2) partner compatibility, and (3) partner commitment. 
Partner complementarity refers to the fit between business partners and whether they each provide 
something unique and/or valuable to the partnership (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Harrigan, 1988; 
Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). Partner compatibility refers to the fit between firm cultures 
and the ways they conduct business, while partner commitment refers to partners’ preparedness to 
invest resources and making sacrifices for the greater good of the partnership (Gundlach, Achrol 
& Mentzer, 1995).  
 
Although each of these attributes are critical to partnership success, emerging research shows that 
their relative importance is tied to context. For example, partner complementarity appears to have 
a more significant impact on partnership success when there is a considerable age gap between the 
firms (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008), or when it is difficult to specify the desired outcomes of the 





implying that it has a positive influence on partnership performance only if partners have 
developed the requisite mechanisms to manage those interdependencies (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
Similarly, partner commitment appears to be key in partnerships where it is easy to specify the 
desired outcome, but difficult to achieve it. In such partnerships, firms must be willing to invest 
resources in the relationship and pledge to cooperate with each other even if circumstances change. 
Generally, firms must be aware of such contingencies while selecting partners that are generally 
complementary, compatible, and committed (Kale & Singh, 2009). 
 
2.1.2 Governance and Design 
After a partnership is formed, the partners are exposed to a wide range of transaction- or 
coordination hazards that can have an adverse effect on performance. Hence, it is crucial to 
implement appropriate governance mechanisms to ensure partnership success. According to Kale 
& Singh (2009), literature has emphasized three types of effective governance mechanisms: (1) 
Equity Ownership, (2) Contractual Provisions, and (3) Relational Governance. 
 
Equity ownership is put forward as an effective governance mechanism by Eccles & Williamson 
(1987). When firms enter partnerships, they expose themselves to the risk of opportunistic 
behavior from their partner if they have invested in relation-specific assets, or if the market 
conditions meeting the relationship are uncertain. To mitigate the risk of such circumstances, 
partners can create an equity-based partnership, where they can either take an equity stake in the 
other firm, or come together in a new, independent venture where both firms take a stake. An 
equity-based partnership has three governance properties to mitigate risk. Firstly, equity aligns the 
partners interests and would make opportunistic behavior damage their own investment (Hennart, 
1988). Secondly, it introduces organized supervision to monitor the partnership’s daily operation 
and can address incidents as they come about (Kogut, 1988). Lastly, equity ownership introduces 
collective dividend relative to the firms’ share, thus incentivizing cooperation (Kale & Singh, 
2009).  
 
Contractual provisions (i.e. formal contracts) in the partnership agreement can also be an effective 





example, specify the mutual rights and obligations of partners by stipulating each firm’s 
contribution to the partnership, clarify what the expected outputs are, or describe procedures for 
exchange and conflict resolution. Furthermore, it can specify sanctions for breach of contract or 
outline ways in which the relationship will end (Reuer & Arino, 2007). According to the theory of 
transaction cost economics, firms should always craft contractual arrangements that secures the 
delivery of a desired good or service at a minimal cost. However, as exchange hazards increase, 
so must the contractual safeguards, leading to increasingly expensive contracts (Klein, Crawford 
& Alchian, 1978; Eccles & Williamson, 1987). Consequently, firms should only craft complex 
contracts in situations with a high probability of contractual breach and/or costly repercussions. 
Williamson (1991) presents three types of exchange hazards that call for contractual safeguards: 
asset specificity, measurement problems and uncertainty. Asset specificity takes place when 
partners invest in relation-specific assets (i.e. assets that only generate value in that particular 
relationship). Consequently, a partnership termination would render the assets useless, making 
them a target for opportunism. Therefore, firms must craft contractual safeguards to eliminate the 
incentives for such behavior. Measurement problems arise in situations where it is demanding to 
measure the performance of partners. Consequently, partners are less motivated to abide by their 
contractual commitments. To mitigate this exchange hazard, contracts can specify performance 
expectations and allow for third-party monitoring. The contractual complexity will typically 
increase linearly with the difficulties of measuring performance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Uncertainty transpires in exchanges where the outcome is unpredictable and calls for partners to 
be flexible when facing unforeseen events. If partners have a formal agreement that facilitates 
contract amendments, they may eliminate any uncertainty that may arise (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Eccles & Williamson (1987) argues that the more comprehensive these exchange hazards are, the 
more important contractual safeguards become. The increased complexity results in higher 
transaction costs and makes it harder to enforce. In situations like this, it may be more sustainable 
to vertically integrate (Williamson, 1991; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
 
Research suggests that the trust, values, and processes that arise from frequent interaction among 
business partners can act as governance mechanisms by themselves. (Macneil, 1978; Noordewier, 
John, & Nevin, 1990). This type of informal governance is typically referred to as “relational 





norms of flexibility, unity, and information sharing, making partners more willing to adjust to 
unanticipated events, collaborate under difficult circumstances, and share critical know-how with 
each other (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Thus, transaction costs are minimized, as partners do not have 
to craft overly specific contracts to cover every possible contingency or responsibility (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). For example, one can eliminate time-consuming contractual negotiations if firms 
trust each other to behave in a fair and sensible way. In addition, monitoring costs can be reduced 
as third-party monitoring becomes redundant. Moreover, adaptation costs are significantly reduced 
as partners are willing to be flexible in unexpected circumstances (Kale & Singh, 2009). Finally, 
partners are incentivized to behave politely, as poorly handled conflicts or bad behavior will likely 
be reported to a third party, potentially ruining a firm's reputation (Gulati, 1995). 
 
Relational governance can also alleviate the need for contractual safeguards against asset 
specificity, measurement problems, and uncertainty. Because partners expect to work together for 
a long period of time, they are not overly concerned about investing in relation-specific assets. 
Similarly, they are not worried about accurately measuring short-term performance, as they are 
confident their output will level out over time. The willingness to be flexible in unforeseen 
circumstances may also help them deal with future uncertainty (Macaulay, 1963; Bradach & 
Eccles, 1989; Adler, 2001; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
 
Even though relational governance may enhance the performance of partnerships (Saxton, 1997; 
Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998), it can be difficult and costly to implement (Larsen, 1992). 
Furthermore, the parties may become too interconnected and block new impulses or information 
from the outside world to enter the alliance (Uzzi, 1997). Therefore, the exchange hazards should 
be relatively large before undertaking the considerable costs of implementing relational 
governance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).   
 
2.1.3 Partnership Management 
For a partnership to succeed, it must be managed on an ongoing basis. Two aspects are crucial in 
this stage: (1) managing coordination, and (2) developing trust. Without sufficient coordination, 





problems can occur if partners lack requisite knowledge of how their actions influence each other, 
what type of decision making procedures the other firm is using, how to correctly distribute 
resources, or how to exchange information (Gulati, Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005; Gulati & Singh, 
1998; Schreiner et al., 2009). Such problems may occur even if the partners principally agree on 
how to proceed in their business venture. To avoid these problems, partners can choose between 
three different mechanisms: programming, hierarchy, and feedback (Galbraith, 1977).  
 
Programming is about creating explicit instructions for what tasks each partner is responsible for 
doing, and when they should be completed. By enhancing the consistency and predictability of 
partner behavior, one can minimize dissatisfaction and speed up decision-making processes, thus 
improving coordination (Kale & Singh, 2009). If firms can implement routines for extensive 
knowledge exchange, they can further enhance coordination (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Hierarchy 
involves making formal roles with authority, where the person(s) or structures in charge facilitate 
and supervise exchanges between partners. Feedback involves partners regularly informing each 
other about their actions or decisions, and periodically evaluating the status of the partnership and 
making necessary adjustments. The degree to which these mechanisms are used is dependent on 
the interconnectedness between partners. Typically, the more interdependent partners are, the more 
complex coordination mechanisms are needed (Gulati et al., 2005; Gulati & Singh, 1998). 
 
Trust and Relational Capital 
Research suggests that trust is an integral part of why alliances succeed, because it lowers 
transaction costs and improves collaboration between partners (Kale & Singh, 2009). Trust can be 
divided into two different elements: (1) a structural aspect centered around the belief that alliance 
partners will not act opportunistically, as such behavior would backfire on themselves (Bradach & 
Eccles, 1989), and (2) a behavioral component centered around the belief that alliance partner’s 
will act reliable and with integrity (Madhok, 1995). The latter aspect is especially crucial for 
partnership performance in the postformation stage (Kale & Singh, 2009). Trust is built through a 
continuous process of interaction, negotiation, dedication, and implementation between partnering 
firms (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). For example, it can be developed by willingly exposing oneself 
to risk by making one-sided investments, leaving it up to the counterpart to decide if they want to 





a vulnerable position to make the partnership successful (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). 
Another way of building trust is to fulfill all promises and obligations, and only make 
commitments that are within your capabilities (Zaheer & Harris, 2006).   
 
A third way of creating trust is to build so-called “relational capital”, which refers to the trust, 
friendship, and respect between partnering firms, shaped by social interaction at an individual level 
(Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000). If the same individuals interact with each other over an 
extended period, they strengthen their social relations and increase their understanding of each 
other’s working approach (Schreiner et al., 2009). Lastly, interfirm trust is influenced by 
institutional factors such as the location of the firms or the surrounding national culture (Dyer & 
Chu, 2003), or the presence of specialized mechanisms to promote exchanges between firms 
(McEvily, Perrone & Zaheer, 2003).  
 
The creation of trust between business partners is critical for many reasons. For example, it lowers 
the barriers for information sharing (Dyer & Chu, 2003), minimizes the risk for opportunistic 
behavior, and promotes flexibility in the event of emerging contingencies (Doz, 1996). Thus, trust 
allows partners to share critical knowledge with each other while simultaneously protecting each 
other’s proprietary knowledge (Kale et.al., 2000). Research has also shown that trust has a positive 
correlation with how satisfied firms are with their business partners and how well they are able to 
co-create and achieve mutual goals (Schreiner et al., 2009). As a result, the partnership is likely to 
become more extensive and persist for longer (Jap & Anderson, 2003).  
 
Conflict Resolution 
Conflict management is a crucial aspect of postformation partnership management (Borys & 
Jemison, 1989), as it may positively or negatively impact the relationship (Deutsch, 1969). 
Successful conflict management includes a variety of factors, such as agreeing on mutually 
beneficial decisions (Bazerman & Neal, 1993), establishing procedures for comprehensive two-
way communication between partners (Cummings, 1984), and facilitating honest and frequent 
interaction to generate close interpersonal ties (MacNeil, 1980). Joint problem solving strengthens 
relationships and facilitates an environment that encourages cooperation. Conversely, the use of 





that only one party can win, will likely have a negative impact and jeopardize the continuance of 
the partnership (Kale et al., 2000).  
 
Monitoring (i.e. the use of formal mechanisms to oversee potential conflicts) is another important 
aspect of conflict management, as it highlights potential problems and increases awareness among 
business partners. Furthermore, differences in organizational culture can play an important role in 
conflicts (Harrigan, 1988; Parkhe, 1993). By addressing these differences in a transparent and 
direct way, one can reduce the potential for partnership conflict and increase the probability of 
partnership success (Kale et al., 2000).  
 
The conflict management process can have a significant impact on the dynamic between business 
partners, and act as a learning mechanism and safeguard for proprietary assets. Additionally, it 
creates a sense of fairness and justice, as partners get an equal opportunity to present and argue 
their point of view. Thus, they become more willing to accept the outcome of a decision process. 
The conflict management process also affects individuals’ personal view of trust and commitment 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 1998), and may positively influence their feelings toward the other party. 
Consequently, successful conflict management can encourage the creation of relational capital 
between partners (Kale et al., 2000).  
 
The communication and interaction facilitated by conflict management may also encourage 
learning among partners. This process is heavily influenced by how close and frequent the 
interaction between partners is, particularly the degree to which individuals in the respective firms 
meet face-to-face. As mentioned, two-way communication and collaborative problem solving are 
both key elements of conflict resolution, meaning that they both facilitate close interaction among 
individuals across firms. Consequently, they can also function as potential channels for learning 
and knowledge transfer between partners. Additionally, the perception of fairness and justice that 
emerge from successful conflict management might make it easier for partners to share know-how 






2.1.4 How Formal Contracts and Relational Governance can Act as 
Substitutes 
Formal contracts and relational governance have traditionally been regarded as substitutes, 
implying that the existence of either minimizes the necessity of the other (Larson, 1992; Gulati, 
1995; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Macaulay, 1963; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Research suggests that firms 
can reduce transaction costs by substituting formal agreements with informal governance 
mechanisms based on trust and collaboration (Adler, 2001). This is based on the previously 
mentioned theory that interfirm trust facilitates flexibility and minimizes opportunistic behavior, 
thereby eliminating the necessity for third-party monitoring and overly complex contracts. 
Consequently, firms save valuable time and resources, reducing their transaction costs and 
improving their efficiency (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). Formal contracts can also hinder the 
emergence of relational governance, as they may be interpreted as lack of trust and confidence 
between partners (Macaulay, 1963). However, if a contract is not sufficiently specified, it may 
encourage opportunistic behavior (Bernheim & Whinston, 1998). 
 
2.1.5 How Formal Contracts and Relational Governance can Act as 
Complements 
Poppo & Zenger (2002) suggests that formal contracts and relational governance may complement 
each other, meaning that combining the two can enhance partnership performance to a greater 
extent than either mechanism by itself. For instance, they argue that a clearly specified contract in 
conjunction with relational norms can provide a framework for improved coordination between 
partners. Additionally, the contracting process in itself may encourage relational governance as 
partners must negotiate and agree on the contractual terms governing their relationship (e.g. 
mechanisms for conflict resolution, penalties for breach of contract, and expected output from the 
relationship) (Williamson, 1991). Moreover, by specifying penalties for partnership termination, 
one incentivizes longevity in the relationship, thus fostering relational governance (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). However, relational governance and formal contracts may also complement each 





contract, it may not be sufficient to preserve a partnership in the face of adversity. Even if it 
includes procedures for contractual refinements, it does not guarantee that the partners will come 
to a mutual agreement (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Relational governance may complement these 
limitations by promoting flexibility and agreement when conflicts and unforeseen circumstances 
arise (Macneil, 1978). Simply put, it creates a mutual desire to “carry-on” with the partnership 
despite any difficulties (Macneil, 1980). Thus, as formal contracts become increasingly complex, 
the presence of relational governance can increase the likelihood of continuing the relationship, 
and thereby further protect specific investments from early and expensive termination (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). Relational governance can also improve the quality of formal contracts, as partners 
can incorporate their experiences in contractual revisions (e.g. successful ways of exchanging 
goods or services, sharing information, and better ways of measuring and monitoring 
performance). Consequently, the complexity of formal contracts increases. Finally, relational 
governance can act as a safeguard against exchange risks that are not specifically guarded by a 
formal contract (Poppo & Zenger, 2002).  
 
2.1.6 Relational View  
The resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) argues that competitive advantage is 
largely the result of firm heterogeneity and focuses on maximizing return through developing and 
deploying a firm’s core resources. Resources must be valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable in order to create a sustainable competitive advantage over competing firms (Barney, 
1991). Dyer & Singh (1998) on the other hand suggest that a firm’s critical resources may extend 
beyond firm boundaries and be embedded in interfirm relationships. However, they emphasize that 
interfirm relationships can only generate a competitive advantage if they are far removed from the 
characteristics of arm’s length market relationships (i.e. limited information exchange, nonspecific 
asset investments, separable technological and functional systems within each firm, low 
transaction costs and minimal investments in governance mechanisms). This is because the market 
allows firms to replace partners with little cost, as other firms can offer nearly identical goods. 
Consequently, market relationships are unable to generate relational rents, as there is nothing 
unique about a particular market relationship that enables it to generate supernormal profits that 





increased output that two or more firms can generate by working together (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
Basically, it is a synergistic effect that gives the partnership value beyond what they could achieve 
individually. Dyer & Singh (1998) characterize four sources of relational rents:  
1. Investments in relation-specific assets. 
2. Substantial knowledge exchange, including the exchange of knowledge that results in joint 
learning. 
3. The combining of complementary, but scarce, resources or capabilities, which results in 
the joint creation of unique new products, services, or technologies. 
4. Lower transaction costs than competitor alliances, owing to more effective governance 
mechanisms. 
 
Investing in Relation-Specific Assets 
Partnering firms can generate competitive advantages by investing in relation-specific assets, 
meaning that they must do something that is unique or specialized to their relationship. According 
to Eccles & Williamson (1987), there are three variations of asset specificity: (a) site specificity, 
(b) physical asset specificity, and (c) human asset specificity. For the purpose of this study only 
the latter is relevant, as the partnerships have not made physical or site-specific investments. 
Human asset specificity refers to transaction-specific knowledge and skills accumulated by 
employees over a long period of time and is not easily transferable to other relationships (e.g. 
employees with years of experience in using a customized computer software) (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Kenton, 2020; Eccles & Williamson, 1987). It may create a competitive advantage by 
improving the speed, efficiency and accuracy of interfirm communication and knowledge-sharing 
processes, thus improving product quality and time to market (Asanuma, 1989; Dyer, 1996).   
 
Knowledge-Exchange Routines Between Partners 
Knowledge-sharing routines are essential for achieving competitive advantages, as they increase 
the learning output of each firm, and thus their ability to stay ahead of the competition (Levinson 
& Asahi, 1995). An interfirm knowledge-sharing routine can be defined as “a regular pattern of 
interfirm interactions that permits the transfer, recombination, or creation of specialized 
knowledge” (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Grant, 1996). A study by Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr (1996) 





technology development, and that partners can generate rents through having a higher-level of 
knowledge sharing routines. Grant (1996), Kogut & Zander (1992) and Ryle (1984) split up 
knowledge into information and know-how, where information is described as knowledge that can 
be easily communicated without compromising its principle meaning. Know-how is described as 
knowledge that is tacit, intricate, and hard to convey to others. Due to the complex properties of 
know-how compared to information, the ability to share critical know-how will probably result in 
more sustainable advantages for business partners, and have a higher probability of outperforming 
firms that are lacking this ability (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
 
A firm’s ability to utilize new knowledge is mainly due to its absorptive capacity, which is “the 
ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p. 128). However, firms may not be able to absorb 
knowledge equally from different partners. This is referred to as partner-specific absorptive 
capacity, and is dependent on two things: 1) to what degree the partners possess similar know-
how, and (2) to what degree the partners have established routines for repeated interactions (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). Furthermore, partner-specific absorptive capacity is strengthened as people in the 
partnership eventually learn where crucial expertise is located within each of the firms. Arrow 
(1974), Badaracco (1991), Daft & Lengel (1986) and Marsden (1990) suggest that knowledge-
sharing routines are more likely to succeed depending on the level of direct, close, and 
comprehensive in-person interactions between employees across firms. Importantly, firms must 
be equally incentivized to share knowledge, be transparent, and not act as passive recipients. 
Incentives could take the form of equity ownership or informal norms of mutual knowledge 
exchange. Research has shown that equity ownership is an especially effective mechanism for 
aligning interests and encourages greater knowledge exchange across the partnership than 
contractual clauses do (Kogut 1988; Mowery et al., 1996). 
 
Resource Complementarity Between Partners 
Partnering firms can generate relational rents by utilizing their partner’s complementary resources. 
Dyer & Singh (1998, p. 666) define resource complementarity as “distinctive resources of alliance 
partners that collectively generate greater rents than the sum of those obtained from the individual 





critical that neither of the firms are able to buy these resources from elsewhere in the market. 
Additionally, it is important that the resources cannot be divided, as this will incentivize firms to 
forge partnerships in order to reap the benefits of each other’s resources.  
 
If partners each contribute unique resources to the partnership, this can create a synergistic effect 
where the combined value of the resources exceeds the value of them individually. However, all 
resources of a business partner may not be complementary and give synergistic effect, and it is 
therefore important to assess the amount of complementary resources that your partner has. The 
larger the proportion of complementary resources, the larger is the potential for generating 
relational rents. However, it can be very difficult to identify partners and their complementary 
resources, as firms may have; (1) different levels of partnership experience, (2) different 
capabilities when it comes to analyzing partnership resources, and (3) different positions in social 
and economic networks, thus affecting their ability to gather information about suitable partners 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). The rents associated with complementary resources can only be achieved 
if the firms have compatible operating systems, procedures for decision-making, and cultures that 
allow for coordinated efforts (Buono & Bowditch, 1989).  
 
Effective Governance 
Governance structure plays an important part in generating relational rents as it has a significant 
impact on both transaction costs and partners’ desire to participate in value creating activities (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). A core objective for partnerships is therefore to select a governance structure that 
minimizes transaction costs and increases efficiency (North, 1990; Eccles & Williamson, 1987). 
Typically, there are two types of governance structures: (1) Contractual provisions enforced by 
third parties and (2) Self-enforced informal agreements. The latter can be divided into two 
subcategories: (a) Formal safeguards and (b) Informal safeguards.  
 
Formal self-enforcing safeguards are typically financial investments designed to align the 
economic incentives of partners. For instance, the purchasing of equity stakes in each other’s 
companies or joint investments in relation-specific assets. The objective is to discourage 





loss. Furthermore, it incentivizes partners to develop their relationship, seeking to increase the co-
creation and value creating activities, ultimately increasing the value of their investment.  
 
Informal self-enforcing safeguards are non-formal agreements that rely on goodwill and personal 
trust. Several scholars have suggested that informal safeguards can be a very effective and 
inexpensive method of reducing transaction costs, thereby improving performance (Barney & 
Hansen, 1994; Hill, 1995; Uzzi, 1997). This is because partners do not have to craft overly complex 
contracts to facilitate and monitor every transaction. Instead, they can rely on their partners to act 













In this chapter, the choices made with regards to the use of research methods, data collection, and 
analysis will be explained. We start by introducing our choice of research strategy and design. 
Thereafter, we explain how we selected interviewees and how we went forward when designing 
the interview guide. We then describe how the data collection was conducted, and how we 
progressed when structuring the qualitative data. Afterwards, we present some reliability and 
validity concerns, as well as some ethical considerations to show that the research has been 
conducted in an orderly manner. Finally, we offer some methodical reflections.  
 
3.1 Research Strategy and Design 
Theory suggests that a case-study is an appropriate research strategy when attempting to answer 
“how” or “why” questions (Yin, 2018). Because our research question seeks to uncover how a 
client-supplier partnership succeeds, a case-study is therefore the logical choice. This can also be 
substantiated by the fact we have no influence over the circumstances and are focusing on a 
contemporary real-life partnership. Moreover, the case method enables us to get an insight into the 
dynamics of the partnership and factors that may influence partnership success (Yin, 2018). The 
goal is to provide a deeper understanding of what makes partnerships succeed. We apply an 
exploratory and qualitative approach based on primary data to highlight various factors that can 
provide an insight to our research question.  
 
Prior to designing our research question, we conducted a thorough theoretical search to find theory 
that may explain relevant factors for partnership success (Yin, 2018). Thereafter, we looked for 
suitable partnerships to address this theory. After communicating with several firms, we came to 
a conclusion that Magnar Eikeland Gruppen was the most suitable choice. Through further 
communication with the organization we were able to find two supplier-relationships that were 
suitable as a case study. Consequently, we ended up with an embedded, single case-study with 






According to Yin (2018), interviews are the best source for gathering data in a case study, due to 
their ability to explain “how” and “why” questions. To ensure a successful interview, the 
researcher must construct and ask reasonable questions and analyze the answers appropriately. 
Additionally, one must conduct the interview in a safe environment to ensure that the interviewees 
feel comfortable (Yin, 2018). 
3.2.1 Interview Guide 
The interview guide is structured, meaning that the content, form, and order of the questions are 
determined in advance (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009. This ensures that the interviewees’ answers 
are equivalent and comparable, as they are given within the same context (Yin, 2018). However, 
to avoid adding obstacles to spontaneity and improvisation, there was an opportunity to ask follow-
up questions. To ensure that the interviews did not take a direction that was irrelevant to the study, 
much emphasis was put on the relevancy of follow-up questions.  
 
The interview guide (see appendix A) consists of 23 questions and covers critical aspects such as 
the importance of relational governance versus formal contracts, the significance of relational 
capital and how to build it, as well as communication and knowledge exchange between partners. 
While designing the questions, a great emphasis was placed on their content and form, as well as 
who would be answering them. For example, instead of using “why”-questions, most of the 
questions were formulated as “how”-questions to ensure that the interviewees did not answer in a 
defensive manner (Yin, 2018). The questions are also open-ended, meaning that the interviewees 
are not bound by fixed alternatives and are free to answer the questions as they see fit. This allows 
for more creative and unforeseen answers, which may provide information that one would not have 








3.2.2 Selection of Interviewees   
In this study, 13 individuals were selected as potential interviewees and later contacted. Among 
these, 11 agreed to be interviewed. The two who declined were from EMO and Ricoh Norge. 
Seven of the interviewees are employees in various positions at MEK and MEKM and were 
selected based on their affiliation with their respective suppliers. Furthermore, one person from 
EMO and two persons from Ricoh Norge were interviewed due to their direct connection with 
MEK and MEKM, respectively. In addition, a board member from Magnar Eikeland Gruppen was 





MEK EMO MEKM Ricoh MEG Sum 
Total  
Management 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Procurement 
and sales 
5 0 0 1 0 6 
Board 
Member 
0 0 0 0 1 1 
Sum Total 6 1 1 2 1 11 
 
Table 1 – Interviewees 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
The data collection process started by visiting Magnar Eikeland Gruppen’s physical locations at 
Sola and asking around for people to talk to regarding supplier relations. After speaking with a 





research question and thesis - an idea was formed about who could provide the most relevant 
information. The potential interviewees were then contacted via email or in-person and asked to 
take part in a comprehensive interview that could provide data for the research question. After 
agreeing to participate, individual meetings were scheduled to take place shortly thereafter. The 
management in MEK and MEKM also put us in contact with management at their respective 
suppliers (EMO and Ricoh Norge), enabling us to start an e-mail correspondence with them and 
book meetings. All interviewees were informed that the interviews would not exceed 45 minutes 
and were sent the questions by email a few days in advance, so that they could prepare. We reached 
out to them a couple of days before the interview to ask if there was anything that needed to be 
clarified.   
 
The interviews were conducted from 17.03.21 to 06.04.21. Six of them were held face-to-face at 
Magnar Eikeland Gruppen’s facilities, while the remaining four were conducted via Microsoft 
Teams due to Covid-19 and geographical distance. The physical interviews were handled by only 
one of the researchers due to Covid regulations and concerns. The interviews lasted between 15 
and 35 min, depending on the interviewee’s ability to answer the questions. This was seen as ideal 
considering factors such as fatigue and time constraints among the interviewees. All the interviews 
followed the same interview guide and were conducted as individual in-depth interviews in order 
to present the interviewee’s personal experiences and opinions, as well as facts.  
 
The interview data was prepared for analysis by transcribing the audio recordings to written text. 
Thereafter, the findings from each partnership were rephrased into keywords and smaller sentences 
in two separate tables to give the reader a clear and structured overview of the collected data. 
Finally, the main findings from each table were summarized in short paragraphs to convey the 
most essential information to the reader.  
 
3.4 Reliability and Validity 
As the interview guide consists of open-ended questions, the study’s findings could have been 
different if the interviews had been conducted again. This weakens the reliability of the study to a 





were asked the same set of questions. This is because the questions were given within the same 
context, ensuring equivalent and comparable answers (Yin, 2018). Leading questions were 
avoided to ensure more reliable answers.  
 
By asking open-ended questions, the interviewees might answer the questions indirectly, or fail to 
provide information that is relevant to the study. This could potentially undermine important 
information and prevent critical elements from emerging. The validity of the study may be 
impaired by this. Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic might have skewed the interviewees’ 
answers, as several interviewees point out the impact it has had on the partnerships over the last 
year. Consequently, the findings could have been somewhat different if the pandemic had never 
occurred, thus weakening the reliability and validity of the study.  
 
As the interview questions have been specifically created for this thesis and not tried before, it is 
difficult to validate them. However, the validity increases as the questions are a product of the 
scientifically validated theory presented in section 2. The questions were also sent to the 
participants prior to the interview, where they were encouraged to look over the questions and 
provide feedback if anything was unclear. This was important to ensure that the questions were 
understandable and that the interviewees were able to answer them. 
 
Furthermore, the use of audio recordings and transcripts results in an accurate reporting of 
information. Several direct quotations from the interviewees have been used, ensuring that their 
statements are reproduced as accurately as possible. The transcripts were also sent to the 
interviewees for revision, giving them an opportunity to correct or adjust their answer, and 
potentially add something new, thus increasing the validity of the data.  
 
Disclosure of Potential Bias 
A potential weakness in the study is that one of the authors has a potential bias due to being a part 
of the Eikeland family and a member of the MEG board. He also has prior employment history at 
both MEK and MEKM. The potential bias implies that the researcher might have had a self-interest 
in portraying MEG in a favorable light. Similarly, it might have compelled the  interviewees to 





potentially have influenced decisions that could have put an end to the partnership or affected the 
interviewees in other ways. However, they appeared to be open, honest, and reflective in their 
answers. As people from both sides of the partnerships were interviewed, it provided a diverse and 
balanced set of experiences and opinions, and thus more valid data about the topics being 
investigated. Furthermore, the second researcher has no direct ties to any of the companies in the 
study and could put an objective view on things when bias occurred. Nevertheless, to increase the 
reader’s confidence in the objectivity of the thesis, the researcher has signed a Disclosure of 
Potential Bias form (see Appendix E). The potential bias can also be viewed as a strength as it 
gives the researcher an in-depth knowledge about the industry and the firms in question. His 
existing relationship with many of the employees could have made them more willing to 
participate in the study and led to more open and honest answers.  
 
3.5 Ethical Considerations  
Ethical guidelines and potential ethical dilemmas that could arise during the data collection process 
have been an area of focus. It has been important to be open and honest about the purpose of the 
study and to protect confidential information. A research application was sent to and approved by 
the Norwegian Center for Research Data (NSD). 
 
All the interviewees were asked to sign a statement of consent prior to the interview, informing 
them about the purpose of the project and what participation entailed for them. By signing it, they 
agreed to the use of audio recordings and how it was stored and used. However, the participants 
had already consented to this in the preliminary conversations prior to the interview. The statement 
of consent also informed about the researchers' responsibility to process the information according 
to ethical guidelines.  
 
Transcripts were made without changing the content so that the written and oral presentation was 
identical. No demographic variables were included, ensuring anonymity for the interviewees. The 
transcripts were then sent to each respondent by email to give them an opportunity to review and 
alter their statements. They were also informed about their right to claim confidentiality and 





3.6 Methodical Reflections 
Ideally, we would have preferred to conduct more interviews, but due to the size of the companies 
the number of people with relevant knowledge was limited. Consequently, it was hard to find 
interviewees with sufficient knowledge to answer each question. It also meant that it was not 
possible to perform a pre-test prior to the actual data collection, as it would decrease the number 
of interviewees. However, all the interviewees provided some insightful information. Furthermore, 
because we sent the interview guide to the interviewees in advance, they may have prepared their 







This chapter presents the findings from the data collection and will provide the basis for the 
discussion. The findings are first presented in two separate tables where the supplier and client 
firm are divided into separate columns to showcase how they each responded to the different 
questions. The questions are listed chronologically from Q1 to Q23 and the responses have been 
rephrased into smaller sentences and keywords. It is not specified which employee has given which 
answer. Lastly, some of the main findings are summarized in a short paragraph under each table 
to convey the most essential information to the reader.  
 
4.1 Magnar Eikeland Kontorutstyr and EMO 
 
 Magnar Eikeland 
Kontorutstyr  
EMO 
Q1 - How long have you 
been in a partnership 
together? 
- Since 2002 with EMO. But the 
partnership dates back to 1996 
when it was called Rich. 
Andvord 
- Started in the middle of the 
90’s, but there was a form of 
cooperation before that also 
Q2 - Before entering the 
partnership, did you 
conduct any due diligence 
of their potential 
complementary resources? 
If so, what were you 
looking for? 
- Yes. Level of seriousness, 
ability to deliver, competitive 
prices, and product range 
 
- Things like local presence, 
ability to act in the local 
market, size, and solidity 
were crucial elements. MEK 
probably also had 
assessments towards EMO 
regarding product width, 
follow-up, orders etc. Over 
time the parties have adapted 
to mutual expectations 
Q3 - How does your 
partner complement your 
existing resources and 
capabilities in terms of 
bringing something unique 
and/or valuable to the 
partnership? 
- By offering the right products 
at the right price 
- EMO have a large product 
range, and enables MEK to buy 
different brands from one 
supplier 
- The relationship has changed 
quite a bit over the years as 
- Local presence, knowledge 
of market, access to local 
customers, sizable salesforce, 
ability to reach out to sizable 
customers through tender 
procedures  
- Customer relations, 





other suppliers can offer more 
competitive prices. EMO has 






Q4 - How is your partner`s 
working approach and 
culture an advantage or 
obstacle for cooperation? 
- After Staples bought EMO the 
culture changed, and some of 
the knowledge disappeared with 
people being laid off in that 
process 
- Since EMO was purchased by 
Staples, the company has 
essentially become a 
competitor, thereby limiting 
cooperation  
- An absolute advantage. 
People at MEK are 
hardworking and put an effort 
into their job. They really care 
about the company they work 
for and want it to succeed 
- You can trust MEK to do 
what they have said they will 
do 
- Similar expectations of each 
other. You know what the 
other party brings to the table 
Q5 - How willing are you 
to adapt to unexpected 
events and find common 
solutions in the face of 
adversity? 
- Very adaptable. E.g. due to 
Covid the firm has changed a 
large part of its product 
portfolio and are now selling a 
lot of masks, gloves, 
disinfectant alcohol etc.  
- Office supplies have been 
exchanged in favor of facility 
supplies. 75 % of the current 
products were not there 10 years 
ago 
- No common solutions 
- MEK is very solution-oriented. 
The company works jointly with 
suppliers to find good solutions 
that prevent MEK’s customers 
from being harmed 
- Very willing, after expressing 
concerns and problems followed 
by relocating their warehouse 
they met up and came to an 
agreement 
- The goal is to be as agile as 
possible. Try to meet the 
demands of the end 
customers, for example there 
have been times where EMO 
has sat down together with 
MEK to make documentation 
that our customers required  
- Try to adapt to the changing 
demand, the products EMO is 
mainly selling now have 
changed from what was sold 
20 years ago 
Q6 - How willing is your 
partner to make short-term 
sacrifices to realize long-
term benefits? 
- Used to be very willing, but 
changed after the previous 
account manager quit 
- Much less willing after 
becoming a part of Staples. This 
- Very willing. MEK could 
have found cheaper products 
in many instances by 
searching the market, but they 





probably has to do with the fact 
that EMO delivers directly to 
customers, thus becoming a 
competitor of MEK 
realize the long-term benefit 
of building a strong value 
chain with EMO. This is also 
a prerequisite for building a 
long-term relationship 
Q7 - Which governance 
mechanisms are used in 
your partnership? 
- No ownership, based on 
formal contracts and relations. 
- Formal contracts, as well as 
personal relationships built up 
over many years 
- Mostly relational, the 
contract is the foundation of 
the partnership, but is not 
used or highlighted in the 
daily business. There are 
some concrete terms 
regarding prices, price 
changes, delivery etc. But the 
partnership is mostly 
governed by expectations and 
relations. There is no 
ownership, strictly a 
contractual relationship 
Q8 - Can you give a brief 
description of the formal 
contract? 
- Competitive prices and 
delivery terms 
- Price and delivery terms 
- Expectations of what the 
firms want to achieve with the 
partnership, and how it shall 
be developed 
- Mechanisms for revising 
and terminating the contract 
Q9 - What type of 
procedures do you have for 
amending the contract? 
 
- Regular meetings between the 
management of the two 
companies 
- Employees can provide input 
- A lot of things is addressed 
there and then 
- No specific routines other 
than a “customer plan” which 
is a dynamic document where 
the partners write down the 
most important improvements 
to implement from one year 
to another 
- There is also a mutual plan 
with MEK where the parties 
write down goals and what 
can be done related to 
increasing product range and 
developing our concepts 
Q10 - To what extent do 
you use contractual 
safeguards? 
- Few safeguards, as EMO is 
primarily a logistics partner  
- Mainly safeguards around 
delivery terms 
- Contractual safeguards are 
rarely used, instead relying on 
mutual trust and 





 there are major 
disagreements, there are some 
contractual safeguards that 
the parties can resort to 
- Resorting to contractual 
clauses means that the parties 
have moved too far apart 
from each other for it to be a 
constructive partnership   
Q11 - How does the 
contract affect the dynamic 
between the partners? 
- As EMO is primarily a 
logistics partner, the contract 
has limited effect on the 
dynamic between the partners 
- It does not affect the daily 
work tasks, and it has never 
been necessary to look up the 
contract 
- Recently there was a 
revision of the contract where 
part of the purpose was to 
simplify it to increase 
partnership dynamic. 
- Goal to have a contract 
which is flexible and one can 
easily include new 
propositions 
 
Q12 - How often do you 
communicate with your 
partner? 
- Daily communication about 
delivery of goods and logistics. 
- - Weekly or monthly 
communication between 
management 
-  Communication happens 
mostly over Teams  
- When needed. Used to be very 
often. Max 1 time per month 
after Covid. Perhaps less 
frequently, but it can also be 2-3 
times a month 
- Daily communication, 
depending on the level 
Q13 - How often do you 
meet your partner face-to-
face, and is it the same 
people meeting? 
- Annual “Kick-off” event 
where salespeople from both 
companies meet face-to-face 
- Management meets once or 
twice a year 
- Always the same people who 
meet 
- Used to be several times a 
year, lately maybe once or twice  
- A Salesperson from EMO 
visited MEK 5-6 times a year 
between 1998 and 2017. He was 
- The goal is to have four 
customer development 
meetings with decision 
makers at MEK per year 
- There should also be a 
physical presentation of new 
products, campaigns, 
discounts, and so on, four 
times a year, or every sales 
cycle. Sales and procurement 
at MEK also participate here 





incredibly solution-oriented and 
had a great relationship with 
MEK’s sales personnel. There 
was communication several 
times per week. After he quit, 
there has been a large turnover 
of EMO account managers  
- After Covid there has been no 
face-to-face contact 
- Normally, MEK and EMO 
meet at a fair called “Metro”, 
but this was cancelled due to 
Covid 
who meet 
Q14 - How have the trust, 
values, and processes that 
have arisen through 
frequent interaction with 
the partner affected the 
need for contractual 
clauses? 
- A good relationship with the 
supplier results in more trust, 
limiting the need for overly 
specific contractual clauses 
- The contract is simple and the 
partnership is very informal, so 
there are few contractual clauses 
- Simpler and flexible 
contract, few contractual 
clauses 
Q15 - How important is 
mutual trust in the 
partnership? 
- Extremely important, and 
absolutely necessary if one is to 
cooperate for a long period of 
time 
- Important to have established 
trust, but the partnership is also 
weighed down by some 
bureaucracy from EMO’s 
owners 
- Very important. However, it is 
not at the same level as it was 
before the merger with Staples  
- Very important, especially 
in long lasting partnerships. 
To have the basic trust is 
crucial, because one can 
collectively develop a joint 
value chain where both win in 
the market and do their part of 
the job 
- A basis for this form of 
cooperation 
Q16 - What have you done 
to build trust with your 
partner? 
- Behaving properly and dealing 
with negative things in a good 
way 
- Try to do what we say, and 
say what we do 
- Open and honest, and treat 
any propositions in a serious 
manner 
Q17 - What routines do you 
have for giving feedback to 
each other? 
 
- Immediate feedback if 
something is wrong. Not afraid 
to tell things as they are 
- Easy to complain, less 
common to complement each 
- Periodic meetings with 
written summaries 
- Follow up points in 






- Use forms for reporting 
damaged goods, delivery time, 
insufficient orders. Often 
addressed in contract meetings  
- A lot of oral communication, 
as well as E-mail, but nothing 
formal 
- Regular feedback through 
forms and communication 
Q18 - Have you established 
any routines for knowledge 
exchange in the 
partnership? If so, what are 
they? 
-  Annual “kick-off” where 
EMO brings along their sub 
suppliers, and offers training on 
various products 
- No “kick off” during Covid 
- Joint visits with sub suppliers 
and some coursing 
- No knowledge exchange 
currently due to Covid 
- Used to be more, feel like it 
has been less lately. More with 
previous account manager 
- Have sometimes shared 
information between each 
other’s departments, for 
example product departments 
- Communicating regularly 
- Created an E-learning 
portal, which conveys 
information from EMO’s 
suppliers to MEK. The portal 
also offers courses on 
products, and allows MEK to 
communicate directly with 
EMO suppliers 
- Cyclus presentations 4 times 
every year, informing MEK 
of new products, trends, and 
campaigns 
Q19 - How do you handle 
conflict? 
- By talking to each other over 
the phone or by sending an E-
mail 
- Want to resolve conflicts as 
quickly as possible 
- Being able to resolve conflicts 
is an essential part of being a 
good supplier 
- Few major conflicts, usually 
come to an agreement 
- Communicating as soon as 
possible usually solves the 
problem 
- Try to communicate and 
negotiate 
- By talking to each other 
until you reach common 
ground  
- There are also mechanisms 
in the agreement that the 
parties can formally resort to, 
but these have never been 
used 
- If the parties cannot agree 
on something, they simply 
move on 
- Problems are solved through 
dialogue and by clarifying 
expectations 
- Important to have the right 
level of expectations, so as 





cannot keep, or give the 
impression of something that 
creates an expectation that is 
not real 
Q20 - Do you or other 
employees have unique 
relationship-specific 
competence? 
- People have different contacts 
and special relationship with 
both suppliers and customer 
- The partners know each 
other well and are able to 
solve problems because of 
their long and good 
relationship. 
Q21 - What is it like to do 
business with your partner? 
What impact does this have 
on transaction costs? 
- Easy when the products they 
offer are a success among 
MEK’s customers, but difficult 
when they are not 
- Usually fine, however there 
have been some problems in 
some cases we have used “drop 
shipping”, and when EMO 
merged their storage facilities 
with Staples. Where 
consequences have led to more 
work to fix faulty deliveries etc. 
- Easy, but EMO has a slightly 
cumbersome procurement 
system. Other than that, 
relatively smooth 
- Easy 
- A well-established and good 
partnership that does not need 
much formal governing, 
which reduces transaction 
costs.   
- Structures are set up and 
well-proven, keeping 
transaction costs down   
- The long-term nature of the 
partnership also reduces 
transaction costs, as the 
parties can find the most 
efficient way to work and 
solve problems 
Q22 - Have any concrete 
changes been made to the 
formal contract? If so, what 
has changed? 
- Yes, previously there was an 
agreement that the parties would 
cooperate in the market, but this 
changed when EMO joined 
Staples 
- Yes. The old contract was 
very comprehensive and 
based on an international 
standard that did not fit this 
type of collaboration. The 
parties have therefore crafted 
a new contract that is shorter 
and much easier to understand 
- In the wake of the NOK 
downturn two or three years 
ago, EMO had to deviate 
from the price regulation 
mechanisms in the agreement 
to continue to have 
availability of goods 
purchased in foreign currency 
- During the Covid pandemic 





force majeure on 
transportation 
Q23 - Is there anything you 
would like to add that we 
have not covered in the 
other questions? 
- MEK currently purchases 25 
% of all goods from EMO, but it 
used to be 50% 
- Nothing to add 
 
Table 2 - Summary of Responses from MEK and EMO 
 
The table shows that the relationship between MEK and EMO has changed a lot since EMO was 
acquired by Staples, one of MEK’s largest competitors. Additionally, a skilled EMO account 
manager responsible for most of the interaction between the partners resigned some years ago. 
MEK explains that these things have made the partners less willing to sacrifice and cooperate with 
each other. Furthermore, the partnership contract is simple and includes few contractual 
safeguards. It is rarely used in the day-to-day operation, and the partners have no particular routines 
for amending it. The contract has a few mechanisms for conflict resolution, but these have never 
been used. Conflicts are primarily handled through dialogue and by clarifying expectations, and if 
they cannot agree on something, they simply move on. They mention that it is important to have 
the right level of expectations, so as not to give promises you cannot keep, or give the impression 
of something that creates an expectation that is not real. 
 
4.2 Magnar Eikeland Kontormaskiner and Ricoh Norge 
 
 Magnar Eikeland 
Kontormaskiner 
Ricoh Norge 
Q1 - How long have you been 
in a partnership together? 
- Over 20 years - Over 20 years 
Q2 - Before entering the 
partnership, did you conduct 
any due diligence of their 
potential complementary 
- Guaranteed, but not working 
in the company at the time. 
Not sure what the deciding 
factors were 
- Not working in the company 
at the time 
- Currently analyzing the 
partnership’s key activities to 





resources? If so, what were 
you looking for? 
partnership is to both parties 
Q3 - How does your partner 
complement your existing 
resources and capabilities in 
terms of bringing something 
unique and/or valuable to the 
partnership? 
- Provides us with the 
products the market wants, as 
well as technical competence 
needed for servicing 
- Local presence and 
affiliation in Rogaland 
- Good sales and service 
apparatus in place 
Q4 - How is your partner`s 
working approach and culture 
an advantage or obstacle for 
cooperation? 
- Proactive and follows global 
trends. However, this can also 
be a disadvantage, as the 
Norwegian market is not 
always mature enough   
- Decisive and active in the 
market 
- Fitting sales culture  
- Good customer portfolio 
- Not afraid to try new things 
or fail 
Q5 - How willing are you to 
adapt to unexpected events 
and find common solutions in 
the face of adversity? 
- Small organization, thus 
very adaptable 
- Work closely together and 
find a common solution 
- Slow to adapt due to being a 
global company 
- Trying to be as agile as 
possible 
- MEKM is more agile  
 
Q6 - How willing is your 
partner to make short-term 
sacrifices to realize long-term 
benefits? 
- Extremely good at having a 
long partnership perspective. 
Therefore willing to make 
short-term sacrifices for the 
greater good 
- MEKM is willing to go to 
great lengths. They look 
much more at the long-term 
than the short-term 
- MEKM is agile and tries to 
adapt to changing market 
circumstances 
Q7 - Which governance 
mechanisms are used in your 
partnership? 
- Formal contract and the 
relations built up over time 
- A mix of formal contract 
and relational governance 
- Partner Account Managers 
govern the partnership based 
on trust and relations (with 
people at MEKM)  
- The formal contract can 
clarify if there are major 
disagreements  
Q8 - Can you give a brief 
description of the formal 
contract? 
- Discount mechanisms, 
pricing, bonus goals and 
terms that depend on 
MEKM’s ability to meet or 
- Partner categories, bonus 
goals and terms, requirements 






surpass the projected budget 
Q9 - What type of procedures 
do you have for amending the 
contract? 
 
- A yearly revision, where the 
parties can express their wish 
of contract changes. This is 
not written in the contract, but 
something that the parties 
have mutually agreed on  
- A yearly revision 
- Want to adapt the contract in 
line with the market 
Q10 - To what extent do you 
use contractual safeguards? 
- The safeguards include 
pricing, delivery time, service 
response time etc.  
- We are obligated to use 
original Ricoh Norge parts 
when servicing our customers  
- Quite a few safeguards 
- MEKM has to achieve 
certain parameters. E.g. they 
need to achieve a certain level 
of growth to receive a bonus  
- No bonus is rewarded if the 
contract is terminated by 
either party 
Q11 - How does the contract 
affect the dynamic between 
the partners? 
- It is not a hindrance for 
business or transactions. It is 
relatively simple, especially 
in comparison to how it was 
before 
- It is rarely looked at in the 
day-to-day operations  
- The main concern is to be 
able to deliver on the agreed 
upon results and budgets, and 
getting the correct prices  
- The content of the old 
contract led to many 
misunderstandings 
- Therefore moved from a 
large legal document to a 
much smaller and simpler one 
that is easier to deal with. The 
parties now fully understand 
the content 
Q12 - How often do you 
communicate with your 
partner? 
- Several times a week - Weekly. This is the 
responsibility of the Partner 
Account Managers. However, 
as MEKM is very forward-
leaning and like to speed 
things up, I (sales manager) 
am also in regular contact 
with them 
Q13 - How often do you meet 
your partner face-to-face, and 
is it the same people meeting? 
- Usually the same people 
meet. However, when 
introducing new products, 
product specialists might be 
brought in 
- Met face-to-face 4-5 times a 
year before Covid 
- Often meet on Teams during 
- Normally 4-5 times a year  
- Typically only sales that 
meet, but at some occasions 
service is also included 
- Have not met face-to-face in 
over a year due to the Covid-






the pandemic occurs via Microsoft Teams 
- It is always the same people 
that meet 
- Great dynamic 
Q14 - How have the trust, 
values, and processes that 
have arisen through frequent 
interaction with the partner 
affected the need for 
contractual clauses? 
- The built-up trust is very 
important and has lessened 
the need for contractual 
clauses  
- If disagreements arise, the 
parties try to talk to each 
other rather than resorting to 
the contract 
- Trust and values are 
important, but they are not 
sufficient to govern the 
partnership. Some contractual 
clauses are needed to 
safeguard against 
opportunism 
- Trust and values make the 
partnership better, and lessens 
the need to enforce 
contractual clauses 
- The old contract was over 
20 pages long, while the new 
one is only 8 pages 
Q15 - How important is 
mutual trust in the 
partnership? 
- Absolutely crucial - Extremely important 
- When trust is established, 
business follows 
Q16 - What have you done to 
build trust with your partner? 
- Achieving good results 
- Generating leads and 
supporting them. This goes 
both ways 
- By keeping promises 
- Treating the partner fairly  
- Face-to-face meetings at 
MEKM is the most important 
factor, as physical presence 
creates more trust 
Q17 - What routines do you 
have for giving feedback to 
each other? 
 
- No formal routines, but 
there is regular 
communication 
- In precarious situations the 
parties send written requests 
to each other 
 
- Monthly contact with the 
sales manager 
- Recently implemented 
“gameplans”, which look at 
sales and what activities are 
most important. It also entails 
constructive feedback and 
strategy discussions from 
both parties  
Q18 - Have you established 
any routines for knowledge 
exchange in the partnership? 
If so, what are they? 
- Continuously sharing 
customer experiences through 
weekly meetings 
- Ricoh Norge has created a 
portal that offers various 
courses. It also functions as a 
- Monthly “webinars”, 
including certification 
courses, sales courses, and in 
general tips and tricks 






chat forum, where the parties 
can share customer 
experiences, challenges, and 
so on  
Q19 - How do you handle 
conflict? 
- Conflicts are handled 
immediately, usually by 
talking to each other over the 
phone  
- Neither party is afraid to tell 
things as they are 
- In more precarious 
situations the parties send 
written requests to each other 
in order to have things 
documented 
- Few disagreements, often 
solved through verbal 
communication 
- One instance where a Ricoh 
Norge partner account 
manager was too controlling, 
trying to dictate MEKM 
actions. After conveying this 
to the management of Ricoh 
Norge, the manager was 
quickly replaced 
- “Head on” 
- Important to have an open 
dialogue where both parties 
can present their point of 
view 
- Usually addressed verbally 
- Often goes back and forth, 
but the parties try to meet in 
the middle 
- Willingness to assist each 
other in difficult situations 
- No major disagreements 
- Certain minor 
disagreements, but these are 
solved through dialogue 
- Some products are not 
successful, and then it is 
important to take things in 
return without creating 
unnecessary hassle for the 
partner 
- Can have heated discussions 
without creating any mistrust 
or ill-will 
Q20 - Do you or other 
employees have unique 
relationship-specific 
competence? 
- Yes, product specialists at 
MEKM have a close 
relationship and cooperation 
with specialists at Ricoh 
Norge, and this cannot easily 
be replaced 
- Yes, people possess 
different knowledge, 
competence, and experience 
Q21 - What is it like to do 
business with your partner? 
What impact does this have 
on transaction costs? 
- As easy as it can be.  
- It requires very little energy, 
time, and resources, thus 
limiting the transaction costs.  
 
- Easy, due to the trust and 
relations that have been 
established  
- Transaction costs correlate 
with how good the relation is 
with the partners, better 
relation equals lower 
transaction costs etc. 





reach our budgets before the 
year-end by placing a larger 
order in exchange for a better 
discount  
Q22 - Have any concrete 
changes been made to the 
formal contract? If so, what 
has changed? 
- It has been simplified - Yes, waiting on a 
standardized contract from 
Ricoh Europe 
- Changes regarding 
geographical delimitations 
and potential contractual 
improvements. The contract 
has become much easier to 
revise and is no longer 
binding for an extended 
period of time 
- A force majeure clause was 
triggered as a consequence of 
failing market conditions and 
euro exchange rate 
Q23 - Is there anything you 
would like to add that we 
have not covered in the other 
questions? 
- Nothing to add - Nothing to add 
 
Table 3 - Summary of Responses from MEKM and Ricoh Norge 
 
The table shows that MEKM and Ricoh Norge have a well-functioning partnership. They are not 
afraid to express their opinion and can have heated discussions without creating any mistrust or 
ill-will. The companies regard mutual trust as an extremely important element and mention that 
when trust is established, business follows. However, they explain that trust is not sufficient for 
governing their partnership, and that some contractual safeguards are needed to protect against 
opportunism. The partnership is therefore based on a relatively complex contract that lays down 
guidelines for the partnership, but it is rarely enforced due to the high level of mutual trust and 
ability to resolve issues through dialogue. The companies mention that they are willing to go to 








In this chapter the findings will be discussed in relation to presented theory and situational context. 
The discussion will follow the structure of the theory section, albeit with a few exceptions. For 
example, “Relational View” and “How Formal Contracts and Relational Governance can Act as 
Substitutes/Complements” will not be discussed under their own headings, as these theories are 
not a part of the critical success factors highlighted by Kale & Singh (2009). Nevertheless, they 
include important elements for substantiating crucial points in the discussion and will be touched 
upon where it is relevant. Furthermore, important elements such as Feedback and Knowledge 
Exchange, Communication, Relation-specific Competence, and Transaction Costs will be 
discussed as part of other headlines. Quotes and information from various answers in the results 
section are included in the discussion to highlight important points. The quotes will be marked 
from Q1 to Q22.  
5.1 Partnership Fit  
5.1.1 Partner Complementarity 
In a client-supplier partnership, the success of either party is contingent on the other. The client 
depends on the quality and availability of the supplier’s product, while the supplier depends on 
the client’s ability to sell the product. Consequently, both parties have a vested interest in 
performing due diligence before entering a partnership to make sure that the other party has the 
necessary capabilities. This was also emphasized by the firms themselves in the interviews: 
 
“We looked at whether they were a serious supplier with a good ability to deliver, and 
whether they had competitive prices and product range” (MEK, Q2). 
 
“Before entering the partnership with Magnar Eikeland, complementary things such as 
local presence, ability to process the local market, size, solidity, and so on, were crucial in 






Similar things were echoed by MEKM and Ricoh Norge (MEKM; Ricoh Norge, Q2), showing 
that all the firms had specific criteria for selecting a partner. This suggests that having 
complementary resources is an important factor when forming a partnership. The findings show 
that the companies still complement each other (MEK; EMO; MEKM; Ricoh Norge, Q3), 
indicating that their partner complementarity has a potential for generating relational rents (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998). However, the results also show that the partnership performance of MEK and 
EMO has worsened over the years (MEK, Q3), suggesting that complementary resources may not 
always generate relational rents and contribute to partnership success. A possible reason for this 
could be that the resources are not critical enough to generate rents as they can be purchased 
elsewhere in the market (Dyer & Singh, 1998). For example, MEK can find a different supplier 
able to supply them with similar products. Furthermore, the worsened relationship could be an 
indication that they lack the requisite mechanisms to manage their interdependencies, and thus 
explain why their inherent complementarity does not have a positive effect on their partnership 
performance (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Consequently, if partnership complementarity is to contribute 
to partnership success, it might need to be based on unique resources that cannot be procured 
elsewhere, and the partners must have mechanisms for managing their interdependencies. 
5.1.2 Partner Compatibility  
Companies often differ in terms of culture and work approach. Some have a bureaucratic work 
approach weighted down by planning and paperwork, while others may have a more “hands-on” 
approach, emphasizing efficiency and progress. Similarly, some companies have a culture that 
values innovation, while others have a culture valuing efficiency. The more compatible the culture 
and work approach between two companies are, the more likely they are to succeed with a 
partnership (Kale & Singh, 2009). Our findings reveal that there is a considerable difference 
between the two partnerships in terms of work approach and culture. Perhaps most interestingly, 
EMO and MEK have a widely different perception of their partner compatibility. While EMO 
believes there is a seamless fit between their work approach and culture, MEK expresses that their 
compatibility has changed dramatically since EMO was acquired by Staples. According to MEK, 
the acquisition resulted in layoffs within the EMO organization and caused EMO to become a 
large competitor, selling the same products and competing for the same customers (MEK, Q4). 





to live up to their word (EMO, Q4). This shows that even though MEK is in a somewhat squeezed 
situation where their main supplier is also a competitor, both are serious actors with a professional 
business practice.  
 
The MEKM-Ricoh Norge partnership paints a different picture, as the companies have a similar 
perception of their partnership compatibility. They both perceive it to be an advantage for 
cooperation, describing it as “decisive and active” (Ricoh, Q4) and “proactive” (MEKM, Q4). The 
rest of the findings support this assumption and can partially explain why the MEKM-Ricoh Norge 
partnership has been relatively more successful than the partnership between MEK and EMO. The 
two partnerships thus illustrate that compatibility can have a significant impact on partnership 
success. By finding a partner that is compatible with one’s own culture and work approach, one 
creates a foundation for cooperation and joint value creation, thus increasing the likelihood for 
partnership success. Furthermore, the partnership between MEK and EMO illustrates that partner 
compatibility can change over time due to changes in market conditions. As a result, the partners’ 
motives also change as the partnership becomes exposed to increased competition and 
opportunism. To address this, partners must communicate regularly and work to ensure that their 
culture and work style converge and not diverge. This could for example be done by clarifying 
expectations for each other in the contract. Being adaptable and agile under changing 
circumstances could be beneficial as well as communicating and agreeing on motives. It is also 
important that partners perceive each other’s compatibility in the same way, or this factor will not 
have a positive influence on partnership success.  
5.1.3 Partner Commitment 
Theory suggests that partner commitment, i.e. partners’ willingness to adapt to changing 
circumstances, invest resources, and make sacrifices for each other are key elements in achieving 
partnership success (Kale & Singh, 2009). The findings indicate that these elements are also 
important in the examined partnerships. For example, they express a common desire to be agile 
and adapt to changing circumstances: 
 







“75% of the current products were not there 10 years ago” (MEK, Q5).  
 
“We are a large global company, so we are a little slower than a smaller company in 
Norway, but we try as best we can. I would argue that Magnar Eikeland is better at 
adapting than we are, but we try to have a type of underlying trust that enables us to reach 
our goals when faced with changes.” (Ricoh Norge, Q5) 
 
This underscores the importance of adaptability, as it is critical to meet changes in demand and 
customer preferences to stay relevant in the market. Failing to do so may result in a loss of market 
share and can potentially cause bankruptcy. Because both partnerships have lasted for more than 
20 years, it shows that the companies have the necessary capabilities to adapt to changing 
circumstances. One could argue that the joint development between partners can foster trust and a 
sense of solidarity between them, as going through difficult and changing circumstances together 
can give a sense of accomplishment. The ability to adapt to changing circumstances could therefore 
be one of the main reasons for why the partnerships still exist today, and thus an important element 
for having a long-term collaboration.  
 
The findings show that the conflict of interest between MEK and EMO has made them more 
reluctant to invest resources in the partnership (MEK, Q6). MEKM and Ricoh Norge on the other 
hand have not been affected by such a conflict and show a great willingness to contribute resources 
to the relationship (MEKM; Ricoh Norge, Q6). This may be an indication that the more partners' 
interests align, the greater the probability is for them to invest resources in the partnership. The 
alignment of interests can be achieved by clarifying intentions and expectations towards each 
other. For example, by making a unilateral investment it signals one’s commitment to the 
partnership, as well as an expectation that one wants the partner to reciprocate the investment. This 
will enhance partners’ confidence in that they are working towards a common goal, which may 
build additional trust between them (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995) 
 
The conflict of interest between MEK and EMO has also led them to no longer being as willing to 





attitude. MEK emphasizes that the former account manager was very solution-oriented (Q13), and 
that since he left, the replacement has been less cooperative. This indicates that individuals can 
have a significant influence on the cooperative nature of a partnership, and that they cannot easily 
be replaced. Consequently, it is important to implement measures to keep these individuals within 
the organization or base the cooperation on several individuals, as this will minimize the risk of 
compromising the collaboration. 
 
MEKM and Ricoh Norge express a willingness to go to great lengths to help each other. For 
example, MEKM makes an extra effort to help Ricoh Norge reach their budgets: 
 
“MEKM is happy to help us reach our budgets before the year-end by placing a larger 
order in exchange for a better discount” (Ricoh Norge, Q21) 
 
The sacrifice signalizes that MEKM wants Ricoh to succeed and that they value the partnership.  
The reason for this could possibly be explained by MEKM and Ricoh Norge’s built-up relational 
capital. By continually clarifying expectations towards each other the partners have been able to 
generate a level of trust which makes it easier to make such sacrifices, as they know that the other 
party will reciprocate it at some point. MEK and EMO on the other hand have not clarified 
expectations towards each other in the same way and do therefore not have an equally solid 
relational capital, which may explain why they are not as willing to sacrifice. This may be an 
indication that the more relational capital one has, the more willing one is to sacrifice for the 
partner and help each other to achieve one's goals. The sacrifice also sends a signal that one seeks 
to have a long-term relationship, further cementing one’s commitment to the partnership. 
 
5.2 Governance and Design  
How a partnership is managed can have a significant impact upon its success. It is important to 
select a governance type that fits the nature of the collaboration and the circumstances one operates 
in. In some instances, the need for contractual safeguards is of utmost importance due to the risk 





safeguards and formal governance would inflict unnecessary transaction costs. Sometimes, the 
partnership could be facing more complex challenges where equity ownership may help to align 
interests. In this case study, none of the partnerships are based on equity, as this is not a typical 
governance mechanism in client supplier relationships of this size. It is also not suitable 
considering that the suppliers might need to have equity ownership with all their clients in order 
for everyone to compete on equal terms. Instead, they are based on a mix of formal contracts and 
relational governance (MEK; EMO; MEKM; Ricoh Norge, Q7). While the contract constitutes the 
basis of the partnerships by outlining certain ground rules, they are mostly governed through 
relational mechanisms: 
 
“The contract is the foundation of the partnership, but is not used or highlighted in the 
daily business. There are some concrete terms regarding prices, price changes, delivery 
etc. But the partnership is mostly governed by expectations and relations” (EMO, Q7) 
 
The belief is that trust and communication are sufficient tools for solving disagreements and 
governing the partnership on a day-to-day basis. This seems to have worked relatively well in both 
partnerships, but to varying degrees. For example, there has arisen some uncertainty in the 
partnership between MEK and EMO (MEK, Q4, Q6, 15), due to them not being able to resolve 
their conflict of interest in the wake of Staples’ acquisition of EMO. However, they still have a 
significant relational capital that enables them to overcome this uncertainty and bring about a 
productive collaboration. MEKM and Ricoh Norge on the other hand have not encountered such 
issues. Their built-up trust and relational capital have enabled them to govern the partnership 
without any major hiccups. However, the formal contract still acts as a safeguard that can be used 
if major disagreements should occur: 
 
 
“The formal contract can clarify if there are major disagreements”  
(Ricoh Norge, Q7) 
 
This suggests that formal contracts can be an important tool when one is faced with considerable 





can agree on. Basically, contractual provisions can provide guidance in situations where one is 
unable to come to an agreement through dialogue. 
 
Contract and Relational Governance 
Every business partnership is based on a formal contract, as it outlines basic rules for the 
relationship and can safeguard the partners against contingencies. It also helps partners maintain 
compliance and can facilitate cooperation between them. However, the contract’s role can vary a 
lot from one partnership to another, depending on the type of governance mechanism one is using. 
A partnership based on relational governance will most likely have a simpler contract than a 
partnership based on formal governance, as trust and relational capital can limit the need for 
contractual provisions (Macaulay, 1963; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Adler, 2001; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002). This assumption is confirmed in our case study, as both partnerships are largely based on 
relational governance and have relatively simple contracts. They address basic things such as price, 
delivery terms, and mechanisms for revising and terminating the contract (MEK; EMO; MEKM, 
Q8). However, MEKM and Ricoh Norge have added more in-depth contractual provisions 
regarding bonus-payment, product display, and use of service components (Ricoh Norge, Q8). 
This makes the contract a bit more complex, but limits uncertainty and the potential for 
measurement problems.  
 
Having a formal contract that facilitates amendments can eliminate uncertainty (Poppo & Zenger, 
2002). The interviews reveal that both partnerships have a formal contract that includes procedures 
for contractual amendments, but that they utilize them at varying degrees. While MEKM and 
Ricoh Norge have annual contract revisions to maintain flexibility and adapt to changes in the 
market, EMO and MEK have no specific routines for revising the contract (MEK; EMO: MEKM; 
Ricoh Norge, Q9). It appears as MEKM and Ricoh Norge want to avoid being bound by a contract 
that does not reflect the current market situation. The reason for this may be that if their contract 
is not properly specified, they risk being exposed to opportunistic behavior from the partner 
(Bernheim & Whinston, 1998). Consequently, it is important to have procedures for amending the 
contract so that one can continuously adapt it to current circumstances and ensure that the partner's 
motives and interests are aligned. One can argue that having formal procedures for amending the 





agree on difficult issues. It also enables partners to incorporate best practices in the contract as the 
partnership develops.  As a result, the contracting process itself encourages relational governance 
(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). If there is a conflict of interest and neither partner is willing to address 
it, it may lead to weaker relational governance and a worsening of the partnership. This may be a 
part of the reason for why MEK and EMO have not come to an agreement regarding their conflict 
of interest, and why MEK refers to EMO as a logistic partner rather than a supplier (MEK, Q3).  
 
Contractual safeguards can be an important tool to protect partners against opportunism and 
contingencies. However, theory suggests that an excessive use of safeguards can undermine trust 
(Macaulay, 1963). The challenge is therefore to find a balance where the contract can protect 
partners’ core interests, but also provide a solid foundation for collaboration. The findings show 
that the partnerships value and use safeguards quite differently, in that MEKM and Ricoh Norge 
have “quite a few safeguards” (Ricoh Norge, Q10), whereas MEK and EMO have fewer safeguards 
and are more reluctant to use them:  
 
“Resorting to contractual clauses means that the parties have moved too far apart from 
each other for it to be a constructive partnership” (EMO, Q10) 
 
MEKM and Ricoh Norge’s use of contractual safeguards do not appear to have had any negative 
consequences for the partnership but have rather clarified expectations and simplified cooperation. 
For example, the fact that MEKM must achieve a certain level of growth in order to receive a 
bonus ensures that uncertainty and measurement problems are avoided (Ricoh Norge, Q10). This 
is quite interesting, seeing as the partnership between EMO and MEK is affected by a high level 
of uncertainty. They could potentially benefit greatly by including safeguards that address the 
underlying conflict of interest. However, doing so could possibly jeopardize their relational capital 
if they are unable to reach an agreement, which may explain why the partners have never properly 
addressed the issue in their contract. 
 
Macaulay (1963) suggests that contractual complexity can have a negative effect on the trust and 
confidence between business partners. Interestingly, both partnerships have simplified their 





and made things unnecessarily complicated (EMO; MEKM, Q22 & Ricoh Norge, Q11). As a 
result, the contracts have become much clearer and easier to deal with (MEKM; Ricoh Norge, Q11 
& EMO, Q22). Nevertheless, it appears to have had limited effect on the dynamics between the 
partners, especially for MEK and EMO:  
 
“As EMO is primarily a logistics partner, the contract has limited effect on the dynamic 
between the partners” (MEK, Q11) 
 
This seems to indicate that the contractual complexity is not what is affecting the dynamic between 
the partners, but rather their conflict of interest. When EMO was acquired by Staples, they 
effectively became a direct competitor of MEK, which increased the uncertainty and worsened 
collaboration. This has led them farther away from the cooperative supplier relationship they used 
to have, towards a more transaction based logistic partnership. Consequently, a contract 
simplification may not be sufficient to improve a relationship dynamic, unless it addresses the 
underlying problem. One could even argue that it could be beneficial to add some contractual 
complexity, as it would clarify roles and potentially promote more extensive collaboration.  
 
Although the contract between MEKM and Ricoh is a bit more complex and includes more 
safeguards than the contract between EMO and MEK, it does not seem to affect the trust and 
dynamic between the partners. Instead, it appears to play an important role in mitigating exchange 
hazards such as uncertainty and measurement problems and facilitate a more extensive 
collaboration. This may suggest that contractual complexity has no significant bearing on the 
dynamic between partners if it is kept at a reasonable level.  
 
5.3 Partnership Management 
5.3.1 Trust and Relational Capital  
Trust is perhaps the most fundamental thing in a successful partnership, as it helps to strengthen 
the relational capital between firms. It is built through being honest, transparent, and living up to 





trusts the other party to conduct business in an honest way where both parties can create value. 
Having trust makes partners more willing to share experiences and knowledge with each other, but 
it can also lead to some challenges, for example if one of the partners exploits the trust of the other 
to act opportunistically. Therefore, it is important to think about the credibility of the partner to 
ensure that one’s trust is not exploited. The importance of trust is highlighted in the interviews: 
 
“Extremely important, and absolutely necessary if one is to cooperate for a long period of 
time” (MEK, Q15) 
 
“When trust is established, business follows” (Ricoh Norge, Q15) 
 
The level of trust between MEK and EMO has changed significantly since EMO was acquired by 
Staples (MEK, Q15). Although the companies still trust each other, there is a lot of uncertainty 
around the fact that they are competitors in addition to being partners. The companies’ failure to 
address the situation has caused a considerable rift in the partnership. This illustrates the 
importance of clarifying roles and expectations in the contract, as doing so could eliminate 
uncertainty and maintain trust. However, the partnership also shows that if the level of trust is high 
in the first place, one can overcome uncertainty and preserve the relationship through difficult 
times. This indicates that trust can function as a sort of relational safeguard and be an important 
element for building long-term partnerships.  
 
The partnership between MEKM and Ricoh Norge also showcases the importance of trust. By 
having a high level of mutual trust, the companies have been able to implement safeguards and 
clauses in the contract without it creating any mistrust between them. This has resulted in a contract 
that lays down clear guidelines on how transactions and interactions should take place, which 
practically eliminates uncertainty and lowers transaction costs. Furthermore, the accumulated trust 
makes business transactions easier, as one trusts the partner to not act opportunistically. Moreover, 
since trust can function as a safeguard to maintain the relationship through challenges, it is crucial 






While trust can be relatively hard to build up, it does not take much to destroy. Therefore, it is 
something that must be continuously maintained in order to preserve and strengthen the 
relationship. MEK and EMO mentions that behaving properly and fairly, as well as keeping one’s 
promises, are important factors for building trust (MEK; EMO, Q16).  
 
“Try to do what we say, and say what we do” (EMO, Q16) 
 
Similar things are expressed by MEKM and Ricoh Norge, but they also emphasize the importance 
of knowledge sharing, face-to-face meetings, and providing support when needed (MEKM; Ricoh 
Norge, Q16). In sum, these findings suggest that good business etiquette is an essential factor for 
building trust between partners. It can also strengthen the relational capital in the partnerships, and 
make partners better equipped for handling challenges and disagreements.  
 
Theory suggests that the trust, values, and processes that arise through frequent interaction may 
limit the need for contractual clauses (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). The findings 
seem to confirm this:  
 
“The built-up trust is very important and has lessened the need for contractual clauses” 
(MEKM, Q14) 
 
This is also shown by the fact that the companies have simplified their partnership contract over 
the last couple of years (EMO; MEKM; Ricoh Norge, Q22). While the previous contracts were 
comprehensive documents that caused a lot of confusion and discussion, the new contracts are 
simpler and easier to understand. This has clarified expectations and obligations between the 
partners. However, contractual simplicity may not always be a positive, as illustrated by the MEK-
EMO partnership. When EMO was acquired by Staples and became a competitor, it was never 
properly addressed in the contract. As a result, the partners had no contractual clauses to fall back 
on when the competitive element became problematic. This shows that it is not always sufficient 
to rely on trust and relational capital to lead you through difficult situations. Sometimes one might 
need a certain level of contractual clauses to protect against opportunism and lay the ground rules 





the status quo. However, it is important to not go overboard, as this can be perceived as a lack of 




Communication is an important tool for building trust and relational capital between partners. This 
is because it necessitates interaction between people, which builds social bonds and enables 
companies to learn about each other’s procedures and preferred way of working. This simplifies 
coordination and reduces transaction costs. Furthermore, it helps clarify expectations, as one is 
continuously informed about the partner’s actions and wants. As a result, you can limit 
misunderstandings and inefficient use of resources. If you have built up a certain level of relational 
capital, you can effectively reduce the need for contractual clauses, as you trust the partner to not 
act opportunistically. Neither party wants to risk their reputation or compromise the relationship, 
as they may have spent a lot of time and resources nurturing it.  
 
The findings reveal that the partners communicate frequently with each other, depending on the 
level. While the sales- and purchasing departments communicate daily or weekly, the management 
communicates far less often, perhaps only once a month (MEK; MEKM; EMO; Ricoh Norge, 
Q12). The frequent interaction has provided a good foundation for building trust and relational 
capital with the partner and may explain why the partnerships have lasted for so many years. It can 
be assumed that the frequent communication has made it easier to address challenges and 
disagreements on an ongoing basis and is one of the reasons for why both partnerships have a 
contract with few contractual safeguards.   
 
The way partners communicate may also have an impact on whether the partnership succeeds. 
When partners communicate face-to-face, they get an opportunity to express themselves through 
body language. If the physical and verbal communication match, the credibility of the message 
increases, enhancing trust. Furthermore, it facilitates small talk more easily, which can provide 
access to information that one would not have gotten otherwise. The small talk also enables the 
sharing of personal experiences about family, friends, and hobbies, which builds a deeper bond 
between the individuals. Personal interaction also provides a greater opportunity to showcase one’s 





affect the partners’ impression of each other, and thus the creation of relational capital between 
them. Face-to-face interaction also shows that one cares and is committed to the relationship, as 
one must invest time and resources to meet up in-person. Additionally, if there is a conflict between 
partners, meeting in-person shows character and says something about one’s intent to resolve and 
compromise.  
 
A consistency in the people meeting can also be an important factor (Schreiner et al., 2009), as it 
takes time to build relational capital. When people learn to know each other, they also learn how 
to collaborate to get things done. However, there is also a risk in having the same people meet. For 
example, if two individuals have built a close relationship over many years, and one of them 
resigns, their relational capital will exit the partnership. Consequently, it can be a good idea to 
have procedures for sharing best practices and relational knowledge throughout the organization, 
as it can prevent such loss. 
 
The findings show that the partners meet face-to-face 4-5 times a year, and that it is usually the 
same people who met. However, since the Covid-19 pandemic hit, there has not been a single 
meeting (MEK; EMO; MEKM; Ricoh Norge; Q13). Ricoh Norge and MEKM have not been as 
affected by these circumstances as MEK and EMO, whose partnership seems to have become even 
less cooperative and more centered around routine business transactions. However, it appears as 
this dynamic had started to change years prior when the previous account manager quit: 
 
“A salesperson from EMO visited MEK 5-6 times a year between 1998 and 2017. He was 
incredibly solution-oriented and had a great relationship with MEK’s sales personnel. 
There was communication several times per week. After he quit, it has not been the same” 
(MEK, Q13) 
 
It therefore seems as if the relational capital between MEK and EMO partly disappeared when the 
former account manager resigned, and that they have been unable to rebuild it ever since. This 
indicates that face-to-face interaction by itself is not sufficient for creating a good partnership 
dynamic, but is highly dependent on who is interacting, as people may have different skills in 





they could for example have tried to share the account manager’s experience and relational 
knowledge with his replacement or another employee. This could potentially have preserved the 
relational capital and made them able to have a better relationship today. It is therefore important 
to be aware of the fragility of relational capital and how easy it can disappear if someone for 
example were to resign. 
 
Feedback and Knowledge Exchange 
MEK and EMO explain that they have good mechanisms and routines for providing feedback to 
each other, but that these primarily apply to negative things (MEK; EMO, Q17). It includes 
notification for defects and forms for reporting deviation in delivery times and orders (MEK, 
Q17). MEKM and Ricoh Norge explain that they do not have any formal routines for providing 
feedback to each other (MEKM; Ricoh Norge, Q17), but that they do have monthly “Gameplan” 
meetings where they discuss sales and activities and have the opportunity to give constructive 
feedback to each other (Ricoh, Q17).  
 
One can argue that the “negative” feedback given between MEK and EMO is not very constructive 
for developing a partnership beyond incrementally improving one’s procedures. If the negative 
feedback goes beyond what is reasonable, it could also damage relational capital. The feedback 
given between MEKM and Ricoh Norge on the other hand is more constructive as it has a clear 
purpose of improvement in mind. It makes it easier to understand and live up to each other’s 
expectations and helps them make the necessary adjustments to eliminate misunderstandings and 
inefficiencies. The positive nature of the feedback also helps them improve their relational capital 
and increase their commitment to the partnership.  
 
By sharing valuable knowledge with your partner, you effectively put yourself in a vulnerable 
position, exposing yourself to potential opportunism. However, it also sends a signal that you have 
good intentions towards the partnership and are willing to invest in it. In addition, it gives firms 
access to knowledge that enables them to improve efficiency and deliver increased value. This is 
because the knowledge shared is being processed and analyzed by more resources than what it 
would have been if the parties were to keep it to themselves. Consequently, the partners’ absorptive 






It is important that the knowledge exchange is mutual so that one partner does not feel exploited. 
Worst case, this may lead to the partner not wanting to share information in the future, and one 
could end up in a situation where there is no knowledge exchange between the partners. This will 
destroy value creation in the partnership and may create an underlying mistrust between the parties 
that can jeopardize the entire collaboration. It is therefore important to agree on how knowledge 
exchange should occur in the first place, so that one has a framework to relate to and can eliminate 
potential opportunism. Knowledge exchange can also promote innovation as partners can inform 
each other about trends and needs in the market, and then use this information to create new 
products.  
 
As the partners possess similar knowledge and operate within the same industry, the basis for 
knowledge exchange should be greater (Dyer & Singh, 1998). However, the findings indicate that 
this is only the case in the MEKM-Ricoh Norge partnership. The explanation could lie in the way 
they exchange knowledge. While MEKM and Ricoh Norge share knowledge on many levels and 
between several employees (MEKM; Ricoh Norge, Q20), the knowledge exchange between MEK 
and EMO has primarily been tied to the EMO account manager (MEK; EMO, Q18). Consequently, 
when the former account manager resigned, the partnership lost most of its knowledge sharing 
routines. They have not been able to reestablish them with the new account manager (MEK, Q18). 
This suggests that knowledge sharing routines should be formalized and tied to the organizations, 
rather than individuals, so that they are not lost when people exit. One can do this by programming 
explicit instructions for what information each partner is responsible for sharing, and when it 
should be shared. This will improve the consistency and predictability of knowledge exchange 
between partners, thus improving coordination and minimizing the impact of key personnel 
leaving the organizations (Kale & Singh, 2009). In addition, the partners may generate rents 
through having better knowledge sharing routines than competing partnerships (Dyer & Singh, 
1998). Furthermore, the findings indicate that knowledge exchange works better when it is 
distributed between several individuals, as it can be continued by others when key personnel decide 
to quit. It may therefore be a good idea to spread knowledge exchange routines between several 








In any partnership, some people will acquire knowledge and experiences that cannot be directly 
transferred to other partnerships. In the interviews with MEK it was repeatedly pointed out that 
the previous account manager from EMO was very good at communicating with MEK and had 
built up a good relationship with MEK's employees for more than 15 years. Basically, he facilitated 
better collaboration between MEK and EMO by improving the speed and quality of interfirm 
communication and knowledge-sharing processes. When he left, the replacement was not able to 
maintain it to the same degree (MEK, Q6, Q13, Q18). This shows how human asset specific 
knowledge and skills accumulated by an employee over many years is not easily transferable (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998; Kenton, 2020; Eccles & Williamson, 1987). If EMO had had procedures to 
disseminate the relationship-specific knowledge that the account manager had about the way in 
which he interacted with MEK, to the replacement, the partners could perhaps have had a better 
and more in-depth collaboration today. Moreover, the findings show that product specialists at 
MEKM and Ricoh Norge have built close relationships with each other (MEKM; Ricoh Norge, 
Q20). However, it can be assumed that their relationship-specific competence is not as unique as 
the previous EMO account manager had with MEK, because it is more based on information 
exchange rather than dissemination and coordination of value-creating activities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
5.3.2 Conflict Resolution 
Theory suggests that the ability to handle conflicts is an important element for achieving 
partnership success. Not only for de-escalating disagreements, but also for developing one's 
partnership, as joint problem solving can facilitate an environment that encourages cooperation 
(Kale et al., 2000). Importantly, the partners must get an equal opportunity to present and argue 
their point of view, as it can increase the likelihood that they will accept the end-result. If partners 
are dissatisfied with an outcome or the process itself, it could weaken the trust between them. MEK 
and EMO explain that they have established formal procedures for handling conflicts, but have 
never used them:  
 
“There are also mechanisms in the agreement that the parties can formally resort to, but 






The parties emphasize that they are able to solve most conflicts by communicating and clarifying 
expectations with one another (MEK; EMO; MEKM; Ricoh Norge, Q19). In those instances where 
they fail to compromise, they simply move on (EMO, Q19). This may be interpreted as they have 
a good dynamic for solving disagreements and that the process itself is not something they shy 
away from. However, MEK and EMO seem to steer clear of the fact that there is a conflict of 
interest with EMO being a competitor. Their reluctance to address it may be because they know 
deep down that they will not be able to come to an agreement. Consequently, the conflict seems to 
undermine the relational capital in the partnership and is a barrier for broader cooperation between 
the partners. This suggests that if such conflicts are never addressed, the relational capital may 
disappear or be stifled, causing the partnership to crumble. Consequently, the partnership can 
become more transactional in nature, rather than a collaboration with common goals. 
 
MEKM and Ricoh Norge have a more direct approach to conflict resolution and are not afraid to 
jeopardize their relational capital in the process of resolving conflicts: 
  
“Neither party is afraid to tell things as they are” (MEKM, Q19). 
 
This shows that the companies have a high relational capital that enables them to express 
themselves freely, without jeopardizing their relationship. Consequently, rather than letting 
problems develop any further, they can deal with them “head-on” (MEKM, Q19). For example, 
when a Ricoh Norge account manager was deemed to be too “controlling”, it was quickly 
addressed without creating any further issues (MEKM, Q19). This indicates a desire to maintain 
the relational capital as one signals to the partner that their concerns are important and that one is 
willing to accommodate them to maintain the relationship.   
 
The takeaway from this is that relational capital can have a profound influence on partners’ ability 
to address and resolve conflicts. The stronger their relational capital is, the easier it is for them to 
resolve conflicts, as they can communicate and address difficult issues without having it negatively 





partners can send a signal that they are committed to the partnership and respect each other’s 
opinion. This can help build trust and strengthen the relationship between partners. 
 
Transaction Costs 
The ease of doing business can have a significant effect on transaction costs in a partnership. If 
the partners can interact and transact smoothly, they can use their resources in a more cost-
effective and appropriate way, thus reducing transaction costs. Which is especially important the 
more often you transact, as costs would accumulate for each transaction. As previously 
mentioned, the partners have built a high level of relational capital which has limited the need for 
formal governance. Consequently, they do not have to craft complex contracts or engage in 
extensive monitoring of each other, saving them a lot of costs. Moreover, the duration of the 
partnerships has enabled them to clarify expectations and learn effective ways of collaborating 
and solving problems, which has lowered transaction costs even further. 
 
“The long-term nature of the partnership also reduces transaction costs, as the parties can 
find the most efficient way to work and solve problems” (EMO, Q21) 
 
One can also assume that the quality of the relational capital has an impact on transaction costs. If 
partners have a high relational capital and show a willingness to accommodate each other's needs, 
they will look past disagreements and work together to find a common solution as quickly as 
possible. This can save them a lot of time and resources. 
 
“Transaction costs correlate with how good the relation is with the partners, better 
relation equals lower transaction costs” (Ricoh, Q21) 
 
The takeaway from this is that transaction costs appear to be heavily influenced by the strength of 
relational capital between partners. Having a strong relational capital limits the need for formal 
procedures that demand a lot of resources, thus reducing transaction costs. Furthermore, the length 
of a partnership enables partners to learn best practices and procedures of the partnership, which 






The purpose of this study was to explore critical factors for partnership success and find out how 
client-supplier partnerships can become more successful. Not unsurprisingly, much of our findings 
coincides with the presented theory. However, we also uncover some new elements that can help 
expand knowledge in the field. For example, it appears as partner compatibility will only create a 
foundation for cooperation and joint value creation as long as the partners have an equal perception 
of their inherent compatibility. Moreover, a sudden change in partners' motives and intentions can 
have a significant impact on the dynamic of a partnership. For instance, it can lead to the 
emergence of an underlying conflict of interest that can have a profound impact on partners’ 
willingness to invest and sacrifice for each other. Consequently, it is important to have procedures 
for amending the contract so that one can continuously adapt it to current circumstances and ensure 
that the partner's motives and interests are aligned. In addition, we find that individuals can have 
a significant influence on the cooperative nature of a partnership and cannot easily be replaced. 
Consequently, it is important to implement measures to keep these individuals within the 
organization or base the cooperation on several individuals, as this will minimize the risk of 
jeopardizing the collaboration. 
 
Furthermore, we have discovered that contractual complexity does not necessarily have a negative 
impact on the relationship between partners if their relational capital is strong. This is because the 
partners will have goodwill and look at the increased complexity as a way to improve the 
collaboration, rather than as a signal of mistrust. However, this requires that the contract is 
relatively simple in the first place. Moreover, when relational governance, knowledge exchange, 
and feedback routines are closely linked to specific individuals rather than organizations, it puts 
partnerships in a vulnerable state. This is because these elements could be lost when the individuals 
exit the organization, which will result in worse conditions for cooperation. Consequently, partners 
could benefit by formalizing their routines for knowledge exchange and feedback as this will 
preserve them within the partnership if key individuals leave the organizations. 
 
We have also found that relational capital can be a key prerequisite for achieving partnership 





to the partnership and help each other reach their goals. For example, by helping each other reach 
their budgets. The relational capital thus increases the belief that the counterpart will reciprocate 
the sacrifice in one way or the other and sends a signal that one is willing to sacrifice oneself for 
the benefit of the other, which helps to build trust and confidence in the partnership. A high level 
of relational capital can also function as a sort of relational safeguard as it decreases the barrier for 
expressing yourself freely, making it possible to eliminate conflicts before they evolve into 
something substantial. Consequently, it is important for partners to continuously build relational 
capital. 
 
To conclude, we believe that if partnerships focus on these factors in addition to the critical success 
factors mentioned by existing theory, they can increase value creation beyond what they could 
achieve on their own. Consequently, their partnerships will become more successful. 
 
6.1 Limitations 
The study only looks at companies selling office equipment and machinery in the B2B market, 
which suggests that the findings may not be applicable to partnerships in other industries and 
markets. Furthermore, the limited number of partnerships being analyzed means that meaningful 
use of statistical techniques for generalizations is not possible. Moreover, the thesis does not 
elaborate on the relative importance of each factor for alliance success, nor does it take into account 
how the different factors interact. One can assume that these aspects would have had a significant 
impact on the study’s findings. Furthermore, one can argue that the study's findings are overly 
based on the conflicts between MEK and EMO, which may cast some of the results in doubt. 
 
6.2 Further Research 
Given the study’s limitations, further research is needed to enhance the confidence in our findings. 
Future studies should therefore analyze a larger sample of partnerships, and preferably across 
many different industries and markets. This would provide more data and enable the use of 





Furthermore, it could be interesting to take things a step further and analyze the importance of 
each factor for partnership success, as well as how they correlate and interact with each other. 
Moreover, it could be interesting to analyze whether the length of the partnership plays any role in 
which factors are important. Finally, one might analyze the research question in light of different 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
 
Q1 - How long have you been in a partnership together? 
 
Q2 - Before entering the partnership, did you conduct any due diligence of their potential 
complementary resources? If so, what were you looking for? 
 
Q3 - How does your partner complement your existing resources and capabilities in terms of 
bringing something unique and/or valuable to the partnership? 
 
Q4 - How is your partner`s working approach and culture an advantage or obstacle for 
cooperation? 
 
Q5 - How willing are you to adapt to unexpected events and find common solutions in the face 
of adversity? 
 
Q6 - How willing is your partner to make short-term sacrifices to realize long-term benefits? 
 
Q7 - Which governance mechanisms are used in your partnership? 
 
Q8 - Can you give a brief description of the formal contract? 
 
Q9 - What type of procedures do you have for amending the contract? 
 
Q10 - To what extent do you use contractual safeguards? 
 
Q11 - How does the contract affect the dynamic between the partners? 
 
Q12 - How often do you communicate with your partner? 
 






Q14 - How have the trust, values, and processes that have arisen through frequent interaction 
with the partner affected the need for contractual clauses? 
 
Q15 - How important is mutual trust in the partnership? 
 
Q16 - What have you done to build trust with your partner? 
 
Q17 - What routines do you have for giving feedback to each other? 
 
Q18 - Have you established any routines for knowledge exchange in the partnership? If so, what 
are they? 
 
Q19 - How do you handle conflict? 
 
Q20 - Do you or other employees have unique relationship-specific competence? 
 
Q21 - What is it like to do business with your partner? What impact does this have on transaction 
costs? 
 
Q22 - Have any concrete changes been made to the formal contract? If so, what has changed? 
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